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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Statments of the case and facts have been adequately set out 
in the Appellant's original brief. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
POINT I 
The notice of appeal supplies all of the information required 
in Utah R. APP.P. 3(dD) by identify the petitioner Gene Russell as 
the Party filing the Notice of Appeal and indicating the appeal is 
from the verdict of the jury last entered. 
POINT II 
Appellant's counsel neither voluntarily agreed to the 
Stipulation nor was the Stipulation correctly given to the jury. 
This deprived the jury of the opportunity to weigh the expert 
witness's testimony against that of Georgia Russell. 
POINT III 
Cases cited by Appellee are not applicable. Appellant timely 
objected orally to the instructions given. 
POINT IV 
Appelleefs arguments are mis-statements of this casees cited, 
incorrect grammatically, or mis-statements of the thesis she cited. 
The Deed - will distinction as to the burden of proof by Appellee 
Supports appellant's position. 
Pursuant to Rule 24(c), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
Petitioner-Appellant Gene Russell respectfully submits this 
Reply Brief. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I; THE UTAH SUPREME COURT TAKES JURISDICTION BY THE 
TIMELY FILING OF THE NOTICE OF APPEAL. 
Pursuant to Rule 3, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
apellant must file a Notice of Appeal with the clerk of the 
trial court. Rule 3(d) mandates that the notice must specify 
the parties taking the appeal, designate the judgment or order 
appealed from, the court from which the appeal is taken and 
designate the court to which the appeal is taken. Appellee 
contends that appellant' s notice of appeal fails to comply with 
this section. However, even though appellant' s notice of ap-
peal is less than a model of clarity, the notice includes all 
the requirements. 
No Utah law directly discusses the designation of parties 
on appeal. Since Rule 3(c) was changed to conform with the 
federal rule, federal cases can provide some guidance. In Tri-
Crown, Inc. v. American Federal S & L Ass' n, 908 F. 2d 578, 580 
(10th Cir. 1990), the court stated that M [t]he caption of the 
notice of appeal named each plaintiff specifically and the body 
of the notice incorporated the caption by reference. " The 
court also noted that the existence of a signature block for 
each plaintiff also indicated which parties were appealing. 
Id. 
Here, the notice of appeal was filed in Case No. P-86-052, 
the will contest matter. The notice was filed and signed by the 
attorney for petitioner and plaintiff Gene Russell. Thus, the 
notice indicates that, at the least, Gene Russell was appealing 
the verdict of Case P-86-052. In Torres v. Oakland Scavenger 
Co. , 487 U.S. 312, 316-317, 108 S. Ct. 2405, 101 L. Ed. 2d 285 
(1988), the court held that although a notice may be techni-
cally at .variance with the letter of a procedural rule a court 
may still find compliance if the "litigant's action is the 
functional equivalent of what the rule requires. " 
Appellee also cited Nunley v. Stan Katz Real Estate, Inc. 
388 P. 2d 798 (Utah 1964) as a bar to jurisdiction for failure 
to designate which judgment has been appealed. In Nunley, un-
like here, the judgment referred to in the notice was void. 
The court refused to accept the appellant' s argument that the 
judgment listed was merely a clerical error and should be cor-
rected to read an earlier judgment. Unlike Nunlev, here the 
last judgment entered is valid and not void. 
In Jones v. Nelson. 484 F. 2d 1165 (10th Cir. 1973), the 
court accepted a notice of appeal taken from an order denying a 
motion for a new trial. The court stated that ff [b]y looking 
behind the form of notice, it is clear the appeal probes the 
validity of the summary judgment. " It followed precedent that 
an appeal will not be lost for "hypertechnical reasons." Id. 
citing Chenev v. Moler, 285 F. 2d 116 (10th Cir. 1960). 
Here, the notice of appeal identified the petitioner Gene 
Russell as the party filing the notice of appeal taken from the 
last verdict entered in case no. P-86-052. Such a notice 
adequately gives jurisdiction to this court. 
POINT II: THE ENTRY OF A STIPULATION REGARDING APPELLANT' S 
EXPERT WITNESS IS HARMFUL ERROR. 
Despite appellee' s contention that appellant voluntarily 
entered into the stipulation, at no time in the voir dire of 
Christine Thornberry does appellant' s counsel explicitly agree 
to the stipulation. On the contrary, counsel objects to being 
forced into a stipulation. Counsel did not voluntarily agree 
to stipulate when he respectfully answered the trial court' s 
questions. 
Appellee' s counsel relies on three cases which differ form 
these facts because in those cases the stipulations were all 
reduced to writing by the parties themselves instead of being 
orally discussed in open court. See, Land v. Land, 605 P. 2d 
1248 (Utah 1980); Birch v. Birch. 771 P. 2d 1114 (Utah App. 
1989); Richins v. Delbert Chipman & Sons Co. , 817 P. 2d 382 
(Utah App. 1991). If the stipulation had been reduced to writ-
ing, the issues of voluntariness and content of the stipulation 
would not exist. 
The resulting confusion affected the jury' s ability to 
weigh the testimony of an expert witness against the tTestimony 
of Georgia Russell who is less than an objective party in this 
matter. 
POINT III; APPELLANT DID NOT WAIVE HIS RIGHT TO APPEAL THE 
STANDARD OF PROOF. 
Appellee contends that appellant waived its right to ap-
peal the issue of the correct standard of proof when he failed 
to submit a written request for a standard of proof issue. 
However, Rule 51 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires on 
that: 
. . . If the instructions are to be given 
in writing, all objections thereto must 
be made before the instructions are given 
to the jury; otherwise objections may be 
made to the instructions after they are 
given to the jury but before the jury 
retires to consider its verdict. No 
party may assign as error the giving or 
the failure to give an instruction unless 
he objects thereto. In objecting to the 
giving of an instruction, a party must 
state distinctly the matter to which he 
objects and the grounds for his objection 
Thus, according to Rule 51, appellant needs only to orally 
object to the instruction and state his grounds for objecting. 
Appellee relies on cases that are not applicable to these 
facts. See Kesler v. Rogers, 542 P. , 2d 354 (Utah 1975); 
Fuller v. Zinik Sporting Goods Co. . 538 P. 2d 1036 (Utah 1975); 
Romrell v. W.W. Clvde and Company. 531 P. 2d 867 (Utah 1975). 
In all three cases, the contention was that the court failed 
to define and instruct on a particular concept. Here, appel-
lant contends not that the court failed to instruct on the 
standard of proof but taht the court applied the wrong 
standard of proof. 
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Even if appellant's objection is inadequate to preserve 
the issue on appeal, Rule 51, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
also provides that: 
" . . . Notwithstanding the foregoing 
requirement, the appellate court, in its 
discretion and in the interest of 
justice, may review the giving of or 
failure to give an instruction. . . " 
This issue is important enough to warrant such review because 
there is no direct Utah law governing which standard of proof 
must be placed on the issue of undue influence in a will 
contest. A decision by this court will affect every case that 
deals with this issue. 
POINT IV: APPELLEE' S ARGUMENT ON THE CORRECT STANDARD OF 
PROOF IS FLAWED. 
A. Appellee confuses the concepts of standard of proof 
and kind of proof. 
Appellee confuses the concept of standard of proof with 
the kind of evidence required to prove a claim of undue influ-
ence. There is no question that the case law requires that 
undue influence must be shown by "substantial evidence." In 
re Bryan' s Estate. 25 P. 2d 602 (Utah 1933); In Re Golds berry' s 
Estate, 81 P. 2d 1106 (Utah 1983); In Re George' s Estate, 112 
P. 2d 498 (Utah 1941); In Re Lavelle' s Estate, 248 P. 2d 372 
(Utah 1952). Appellee claims that substantial evidence 
relates directly to the standard of proof. Appellee supports 
this assertion in a number of flawed ways. 
First, Appellee claims the court in Anderson v. Anderson, 
134 P. 553 (Utah 1913) uses a standard of proof greater than a 
preponderance of the evidence. However, at no point does the 
court discuss a standard of proof nor does Appellee show how 
Anderson supports such a claim. 
Second, Appellee uses a grammatical argument on a section 
of In Re Buttars, 261 P.2d 171 (Utah 1953). The sentence in 
question states: 
By this evidence the proponents made out 
a prima facie case entitling the will to 
be admitted to probate and it then became 
incumbent on the contestants to prove by 
a preponderance of evidence that the 
testatrix did not have a sound and 
disposing mind at the time she executed 
the will or that she was acting under 
fraud, menace or undue influence. 
Id. at 172. Appellee' s argument that the Buttars Court' s 
reference to preponderance standard only applies to claims of 
incompetency is illogical. 
The grammatical structure of the sentence is "contestant 
must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that [first 
point] £r that [second point]." By structuring the sentence 
this way, the author is stating that the party must prove by a 
preponderance either one or the other point. This is an ac-
ceptable grammatical contraction for "contestant must prove by 
a preponderance that [first point] or the party must prove by a 
preponderance that [second point]." Appellee's interpretation 
is correct only if the sentence would have been written 
"contest must prove that [first point] by, a preponderance or 
that [second point]." 
Third, appellee' s argument that substantial proof is 
equivalent to a standard of clear and convincing evidence is 
rebutted by his own citation to 95 C.J.S. Wills Section 251. 
This section states that some authorities require a preponder-
ance of the evidence and some require clear and convincing 
evidence but all require substantial evidence. 
Last, the Utah Supreme Court has required "substantial 
proof" where the standard of proof was a preponderance of 
evidence in two cases that are not will contests. Rowe v. 
Rove, 365 P. 2d 797, 797 (Utah 1961) (•'. . . the conclusions of 
the trial court in a case like this will remain inviolate if 
supported by a preponderance of competent, substantial and 
believable evidence . . . " ) ; Piute Reservoir & Irr. Co. v. West 
Pancruitch I. & R. Co. . 364 P. 2d 113, 116 (Utah 1961) ("It must 
support a decision in its favor on this question by substantial 
evidence and it has the burden of convincing the trier of facts 
by a preponderance of all the evidence that such change. . . " ) . 
B. Appellee7 s own distinctions between will contests and 
deed contests supports appellant' s argument. 
Appellee argues that undue influence is undue influence 
regardless of whether a will or a deed is attacked. Appellee' s 
recitation of the different tests for mental capacity for deeds 
and wills show the very reason for different standards of proof 
for undue influence. Appellee is correct in relying on 
Northcrest, Inc. V. Walker Bank & Trust Cop. , 248 P. 2d 692,693 
(Utah 1952) for the proposition that an attack on a deed for 
invalidity must be proved by clear and convincing evidence. An 
entire line of cases support this point. See Richmond v. 
Ballard. 325 P.2d 839 (Utah 1958); Bradbury v. Rasmussen. 401 
P. 2d 710 (Utah 1965); Controlled Inc. V. Harman, 413 P. 2d 807 
(Utah 1966); Baker v. Pattee, 684 P. 2d 632 (Utah 1984) ("A 
party attacking the validity of a written instrument must do so 
by clear and convincing evidence"). 
Appellee claims that Anderson v. Brinkerhoff, 756 P. 2d 92 
(Utah Ct. App. 1988) is not a correct statement of law. He 
fails to explain why it is wrong. In Anderson, a deed was at-
tacked due to the incompetency of the grantor. Since an 
instrument was being attacked, according to precedent, the 
standard of proof must then be one of clear and convincing 
evidence. 
Appellee equates undue influence with fraud and reasons 
that both require the same standard of proof. Even though no 
Utah case has ever discussed this issue, the majority rule is 
that fraud in a will contest requires clear and convincing 
evidence. In re Undziakiewics Estate, 203 N. E. 2d 434 (111. 
App. 1964); In re Elias, 239 A. 2d 393 (Penn. 1968). 
However, despite the obvious similarities there is a very 
clear cut difference between undue influence and fraud. 
Undue influence consists in exerting suf-
ficient pressure or influence upon the 
testator to break down his will power and 
overcome his free agency or free will so 
that he is unable to keep from doing that 
which he would not otherwise do. Such 
undue influence need not involve the use 
of false and fraudulent representations 
or untrue statements. . . . 
Fraud on the other hand need not 
involve the overpowering of the 
testator' s free agency or will power, 
though it is by no means impossible that 
false statements may be so used to harass 
the testator to the point that he is both 
tricked and deprived of his will power. 
The basic ingredient of fraud however is 
that the e testator is deceived through 
the use of false information, so that his 
free will or free agency, of which he is 
not deprived, is exercised upon the basis 
of false information. 
1 Pace on Wills 14. 3 at p. 694. 
Appellee is also incorrect on a number of small points. 
Appellee's statement that a will is effective on execution is 
false. A will is revocable until death and generally does not 
govern the distribution of property until it is admitted to 
probate. (Although a will can transfer property without being 
probated by affidavit, Utah Code Ann. 75-3-120 or by informal 
probate, Utah Code Ann. 75-3-201 et. seq. Additionally, 
although third parties can rely on a testator' s statement, this 
is also true of any promise and is unrel-ated to the recording 
of a deed which does not include any oral representations. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, appellant respectfully requests 
that the judgment should be reversed in part and the case 
remanded for new trial. 
Respectfully submitted this 32 tt day of September 
1992. 
Attorney for Appellant 
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